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After the 9/11 catastrophe, insurgents and terrorists have shown us that they will 
continue to employ asymmetric threats to carry out their objectives, by using any 
available equipment or any available route to their objective that remains unchecked or 
unchallenged, like car bombs, suicide bombers, and commercial airplanes.  In response, 
the United States and its allies are focusing harder on data sharing efforts in order to 
improve the situational awareness (SA) of command and control (C2) structures, to make 
quicker decisions, and to collaborate with remote experts on chemical, biological, and 
radiological elements, biometrics, or explosive devices. 
This thesis discusses the data sharing contributions and features of collaborative 
tools used onboard a boarding vessel in a riverine area and participating nodes to provide 
or to enhance the SA and decision making process during EMIOs.  As maritime 
operational experiments, conducted by the Center for Network Innovation and 
Experimentation (CENETIX), are more successful with each successive MIO 
experiment, a better understanding for methods of sharing substantial data captured 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Time, space, and force are factors which affect the outcome of any confrontation 
between opposing forces.  Years before the 9/11 attacks on American soil, asymmetric 
threats have been employed by terrorists to achieve their objectives by using car bombs 
or suicide bombers.  Even though riverine areas have not seen great action since the Viet 
Nam War, in March 2006, the United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) recognized 
the efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to protect our nation’s seaports.  In the 
Audit Report 06-26 from the Office of the Inspector General, March 2006, the following 
facts were recognized. 
• 95 percent of overseas trade flows through the more than 360 seaports and 
inland waterways of the United States. 
• Large metropolitan areas and hazardous chemical storage facilities within 
short range of these seaports can become vulnerable terrorist’s targets. 
• According to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States (9/11 Commission), maritime terrorism has the same or 
higher probability to occur as aviation terrorism. 
• The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan supports the 
National Strategy for Maritime Security. 
Therefore, it is necessary for foreign and domestic military and civilian maritime 
interdiction forces to work together by sharing data through common collaborative tools 
in order to dominate the information domain to meet or surpass any asymmetric threats 
from terrorists or counterinsurgents in the maritime environment.  Furthermore, due to 
their complex environment, riverine areas provide terrorists or criminals the route they 




or littoral body of water. In some areas of the world, the riverine areas are further 
complicated by the amount of civilian traffic flowing through it or the surrounding 
terrain.   
To add to this dilemma of high civilian maritime traffic, the time spent processing 
every possible target vessel or suspect can easily give the opposing force the advantage of 
escaping through riverine maritime interdiction forces facing multiple targets.  
Furthermore, every boarding by maritime interdiction forces is complicated by copious 
amounts of data sharing between the interdiction force and remote supporting agencies, 
assistance centers, or experts.  To counteract this dilemma in both domestic and foreign 
locations, maritime interdiction forces must improve the situational awareness (SA) of 
command and control (C2) structures through data sharing capabilities and data 
management resources that will enable them to quickly confront every suspected threat 
without losing efficiency. 
In past Maritime Interdiction Operations, communications between the BP and 
boarding vessel were established via standard two-way walkie-talkie radios.  (Marvin, 
2005)  Furthermore, the BP was very slow to capture, send, and process data.  Real-time 
collaboration with C2 elements and participating agencies was not available, since all 
data was hand-written by the BP, transmitted to the boarding vessel via radio talker, 
rewritten on another report, and then incorporated with other data into a message to the 
Maritime Interdiction Operation Warfare Commander via DoD SATCOM.  (Marvin, 
2005)  This manpower intensive and time-wasteful method of sharing data gives 
substantial reason to why real-time collaborative tools need to be incorporated into MIO 
experiments.   
In order to provide expeditious data sharing from a mobile wireless node placed 
onboard a riverine unit, an ad-hoc network reaching from the riverine unit back to the 
Tactical Operations Center (TOC) has to be established and supported by collaborative 
tools to enhance the SA of all MIO participants.  The Navy has a long history of using 
various coordination methods using VHF handheld radios to establish communications 
between riverine assets and operation centers in order to find riverine-based criminals or 
terrorists and execute maneuvers or plans to capture these targets.  Currently, the VHF 
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handheld radios are still used only to provide a redundant line of communications 
between the BP and boarding vessel.  However, as years have gone by since the inception 
of these kinds of operations, new network technology and collaborative tools have been 
implemented for faster and more reliable data sharing to improve the decision-making 
process. 
In recent years, wireless technology and collaborative tools have made a huge 
leap into society.  As such, maritime interdiction forces operating in riverine areas have 
been able to keep up with these capabilities to explore and to exploit its advantages in 
order to establish and expedite data sharing with operation centers and remote experts.  
The objective of The Tactical Network Topology Maritime Interdiction Operations “was 
to continue to evaluate the use of networks, advanced sensors, and collaborative 
technology for rapid Maritime Interdiction Operations; specifically, the ability for a 
Boarding Party (BP) to rapidly set up ship-to-ship communications that enable the BP to 
search for radiation and explosive sources.  The necessity to maintain network 
connectivity with command and control (C2) elements and collaborating with remotely 
located sensor experts were also key objectives.” (TNT 07-4 AAR) 
During past TNT MIO experiments, data sharing tools have been employed to 
raise the SA of participating nodes and to include inputs from remote experts in the 
continental United States (CONUS), which have the facilities or capabilities to further 
analyze captured data, in order to expedite the decision-making process.  Quarter by 
quarter, TNT MIO experiments have evolved to become more operationally realistic and 
complex by including substantial data from radiation sensors and biometric devices 
coupled with geographically distributed support agencies and participants, who can bring 
substantial intelligence about the MIO scenario.  This thesis will examine the evolution of 
the data sharing aspect of MIO experiments driven by the CENETIX at NPS.  
Furthermore, this thesis will attempt to determine if one data sharing tool alone can 
handle or surpass the SA requirements for expeditious decision-making among the 
riverine unit, the TOC, and geographically distributed supporting nodes. 
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B. OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this study are to examine: 
• How the data sharing tools explored in previous experiments contributed 
to the decision-making process under more diverse operational conditions 
in the Monterey and San Francisco bay areas. 
• How the data sharing tools contributed to the decision-making process 
during the recent TNT MIO 08-2 experiment under operational conditions. 
• The features to improve upon the data sharing contributions for future 
experiments conducted under more complex operational conditions. 
C. RESEARCH TASKS 
1. Data Sharing Requirements 
• What features should the collaborative tools provide in order to meet or to 
enhance the SA and data sharing contributions of all participating nodes in 
an operational environment? 
• What kind of data is going to be shared through the collaborative tools, i.e. 
files, video, chat, radiation sensor data, and through what equipment, i.e. 
video conference equipment or flash drive downloads? 
• How is data sharing going to improve or to expedite the boarding officer’s 
and TOC’s decision-making process during the EMIO? 
2. Remote Experts Data Sharing Capabilities 
• Which data sharing tools are available for remote experts included in the 
MIO network to provide a route and feedback of captured data or to 
interact with geographically distributed participants? 
• How did the data sharing occur in geographically distributed sites between 
the riverine area, open bay, and open waters? 
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• Which data sharing tasks may be automated to eliminate human-in-the-
loop data exchange process? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis is to discuss the contributions and features of 
collaborative tools in MIO networks in operational conditions to improve the SA and 
decision-making process of all involved MIO participants. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Previous TNT MIO experiments will provide a background of information on the 
contributions and expectations of data sharing tools.  By comparing previous results with 
TNT MIO 08-2 data sharing results, specifically in the riverine area, the collaborative 
tools can be further examined to recommend improvements. 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter II describes remote experts, data 
sharing tools, and types of shared data.  Chapter III summarizes the data sharing 
environment in past MIO experiments.  Chapter IV describes the data sharing aspect of 
the recent TNT MIO 08-2 experiment in the riverine area and its results.  Chapter V 
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II. REMOTE EXPERTS, DATA SHARING TOOLS, AND TYPES 
OF DATA 
A. CONTRIBUTIONS OF REMOTE EXPERTS 
1. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL) 
The purpose of LLNL, with respect to the MIO operational experiments 
conducted, is to provide remote expert intelligence about the sensor data captured during 
a MIO and provide the TOC or BP feedback or recommendations for further analysis by 
their experts.  Due to the limited personnel which comprise a BP, none of which are 
scientists, at this time, a near real-time reach back must provide the BP and the TOC a 
route for crucial information sharing needed to decide whether or not a suspected target 
vessel is carrying nuclear material. 
To further assist the expeditious inspection of the target vessel or simply give the 
maritime interdiction forces the opportunity to deter a target vessel from penetrating from 
international into territorial or even riverine waters, the LLNL has two types of 
equipment which help in the detection of nuclear material.  If the target vessel (TV) is 
emitting nuclear radiation to the environment, whether or not the TV is capable of 
traveling in Riverine waters, the LLNL has an exterior-mounted sensor, which can pick 
up the emitted radiation, when it drives within a close range of the TV.  This ARAM 
sensor can be used more appropriately in inland waters due to the nature of traffic flow 
and traffic scheme.  Otherwise, at close range in open ocean waters, a large TV is capable 
of travelling at dangerous speeds for a comparably smaller maritime interdiction vessel to 
pick up any nuclear radiation without keeling over from the Coriollis effect developed 
between the two vessels.  
Since “radioactive material is everywhere from the concrete in our streets to the 
food we eat,” if a large vessel is suspected of carrying nuclear material, but is not 
radiating out into the environment towards any LLNL radiation sensor, then the other 
type of LLNL sensor applies.  (Dougan, 2004)  This handheld sensor, appropriately 
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called the IdentiFINDER, is used by BP personnel during their more intricate inspection 
of the TV’s interior and topside spaces.  The data collected from these locally 
implemented radiation sensors have to be provided with a real-time path back to the 
LLNL for further analysis and successive handling instructions from the laboratory.  
Without the prompt analysis of radiation data captured locally, maritime vessels can be 
detained indefinitely and unnecessarily from something as simple as a smoke detector, 
which holds in it Americum-241.  (Dougan, 2004)  Thus, this is why the LLNL must be a 
remote collaborating expert included as a node in the EMIO network topology. 
Furthermore, LLNL officials respond regularly when local Customs and Coast 
Guard officials at the San Francisco Airport and the Port of Oakland receive unusual 
alerts on their radiological pagers. The Lab has field-tested a number of portable radiation 
monitors at both locales to assist in the detection of weapons of mass destruction. In 
addition, LLNL is working closely with the California Highway Patrol to develop 
additional radiation detection technology to prevent smuggling of radioactive material 
into the State. 
 
 
Figure 1. Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor 
(From Dougan, 2003) 
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2. Biometrics Fusion Center (BFC) 
The Biometrics Fusion Center, located in Clarksburg, West Virginia, is a remote 
expert in these MIO experiments, which can provide the intelligence derived from 
biometric data collected at the tactical level of operations.  Established in December 
2000, the BFC performs various biometrics field researches, of which biometric 
repository support to the Department of Defense (DoD) is the most important to EMIO.  
One of its core functions includes establishing and maintaining an authoritative biometric 
data source in order to provide timely, accurate and comprehensive Identity Superiority 
to the war fighter, which in this case are the MIO TOC personnel.  (WV Biometrics 
Initiative Website, 2008)  Therefore, even when a new suspect or criminal is 
apprehended, the BP must be able to quickly send biometric data to the BFC in order to 
update their database.  To achieve this objective, it is necessary to include the BFC and 
any linking nodes in the EMIO network. 
3. United States Coast Guard 
The Coast Guard, as part of the Department of Homeland Security, reports 
directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. However, upon the declaration of war 
and when Congress or the President directs, the Coast Guard operates under the 
Department of Defense as a service in the Department of the Navy.  Under 14 U.S.C. 
Section 2 the Coast Guard is authorized to enforce federal law.  Furthermore, the Coast 
Guard is exempt from and not subject to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act 
which restrict the law enforcement activities of the other four military services within 
United States territory.  (Wikipedia, 2008) 
Operated by the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Response Center (NRC) is the 
sole U.S. Government point of contact for reporting environmental spills, contamination, 
and pollution.  The primary function of the National Response Center (NRC) is to 
serve as the sole national point of contact for reporting all oil, chemical, radiological, 
biological, and etiological discharges into the environment anywhere in the United 
States and its territories.  The NRC maintains agreements with a variety of federal 
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entities to make additional notifications regarding incidents meeting established 
trigger criteria. The NRC also takes Terrorist/Suspicious Activity Reports and 
Maritime Security Breach Reports.  (USEPA Website, 2007) 
4. Federal and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 
• The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) has a database called the 
Guardian Threat Tracking System (Guardian), which holds information on 
maritime and other terrorist threats and suspicious incidents.   
• Oakland, San Francisco, and Sacramento maritime interdiction forces 
collaborate with each other and with USCG to provide the manpower, 
intelligence reports, and interdiction tactics to further assist the C2 
elements in finding maritime terrorists or HVTs. 
• The mission of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency is to reduce the 
threat to the United States and its allies from nuclear, biological, chemical 
weapons, other special weapons, and conventional weapons, through the 
execution of technology security activities, cooperative threat reduction 
programs, arms control treaty monitoring and on-site inspections, force 
protection, nuclear, biological, chemical defenses, and counter-
proliferation.  (Harahan & Bennett, 2002)  As a combat support agency, 
founded in 1998 at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, under the U.S. Department of 
Defense, it is composed of three enterprises, which include Combating 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Enterprise, Operations 
Enterprise, and Research and Development Enterprise.  It is the DTRA’s 
CWMD Enterprise’s technical support in MIOs that makes them a 
valuable asset to incorporate in the decision making process when WMDs 
are involved. 
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5. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)  
The NRL provides Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) capabilities to local and remote 
government agencies.  During the experiments, the NRL provided imaging of Monterey 
bay and radiation spectrum files to LLNL. 
6. Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC) 
The role of MIFC is to provide maritime traffic information such as ships’ 
registries, cargo and crew manifests, ports of call, and shipping schedules. This 
information is helpful in order to designate a vessel as suspect, locate it, make its 
interdiction possible, and confirm discrepancies onboard, such as fake documentation. 
(Stavroulakis, 2006) 
7. United States Department of Energy (USDOE) 
Under the USDOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 
handles worldwide radiological accidents and incidents through various assets, one of 
which is the Radiological Assistance Program (RAP).  RAP is one of NNSA’s first 
responders for assessing situations to minimize hazards of a radiological emergency 
through assessment, area monitoring, air sampling, and exposure and contamination 
control.  Able to arrive within four to six hours of notification of a radiological 
emergency, RAP personnel use state-of-the-art equipment to help identify or minimize 
radiological hazards.  (RAP, 2008) 
8. Coalition Partners 
Coalition partners are involved in the experiments to bring in a geographically 
distributed node perspective in the MIO experiments conducted with operational 
conditions.  Austria, Sweden, and Singapore have been greatly involved with the San 
Francisco MIO experiments conducted in collaboration with CENETIX, NRL, USCG 
District 11, LLNL, LBNL, BFC, MIFC, DTRA, and local maritime interdiction forces 
from San Francisco, Oakland, and Sacramento in order to better evaluate the 
geographically distributed collaboration of MIOs using rapidly-deployed wireless 
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networks and collaborative tools to augment pre-established wireless backbones, 
databases, VPN, and public internet access.  Through their participation in the MIO 
experiments, a better commitment to understanding how international participants help to 
provide data necessary to evaluate a MIO situation involving terrorists, radiation 
materials, or WMDs 
B. DATA SHARING TOOLS 
1. GROOVE V3.0 
The following MIO pertinent features are available in the Groove V3.0 software. 
• Contact Manager- to create a list of shared contacts 
• Discussion- to discuss topics within the workspace 
• Document Review- to review documents in the workspace 
• Files- to manage shared files 
 
 
Figure 2. Snapshot of Radiological Files Posted in LLNL Workspace  




• Pictures- to display or share photos or graphics 
• Chat- to chat within workspace 
• Alerts- used to alert member’s in a workspace when any changes have 
occurred 
• Team formation- used to invite members into a workspace through e-mail 
invitation or a file invitation 
• Presence Awareness- allows workspace members to find out who is 
logged into Groove and in what subdivision of the workspace they are 
working 
• Security- implements 192-bit encryption technology, which are Federal 
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 and Common Criteria 
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 2+ certified 
For further information about this software, read NPS Thesis by Klopson and 
Burdian, March 2005 or www.groove.net. 
2. SA Multi-Agent 
The NPS SA Multi-Agent architecture was created in 2002 by Dr. Alex Bordetsky 
and Eugene Bourakov. (Bordetsky, 2002).  The software development and 
implementation of SA Multi-Agent system is provided by Eugene Bourakov.  The NPS 
SA uses maps or charts of the operating area of interest.  Three ways to plot agents on the 
map are by clicking and dragging a symbolic icon (i.e. person, vehicle, sensor, etc.), by 
entering a latitude and longitude associated with a symbolic icon, or by Global 
Positioning System (GPS) device.  (Klopson & Burdian, 2005)  Figure 3 below shows a 
“snapshot of OFDM throughput-distance relationship analysis experiment.  In the figure, 
the balloon icon is used to represent the Man-Pack/LRV mobile OFDM node.”  (TNT 05-




• Real-time shared updates on icons to enhance the SA of the operation. 
• Voice and/or visual alerts on updates to prompt users of any changes. 
• Customizable background maps to enhance the SA of the environment. 
• Replay capability available through database storage of historical changes. 
• Instant Messaging available by composing a message and dragging to the 
recipient’s icon. 
• Agent Information Sharing is available through an “Info” arrow button 
dragged and dropped on the icon representing the agent of interest.  This 
method allows the user to view network connection status, general agent 
information, and to hear or see the agent (if this capability is set up).  
Video and audio triggers can be enabled or disabled to either transmit or 
not when there is any motion or sound detected at the location of the agent 
of interest. 
• The Alert System provides alerts which are agent generated to notify other 
active agents of the alert being posted.  Active agents then drag and click 
the “Info” arrow above the alert for amplifying information. 
For further information about this software, read the NPS thesis by Klopson and 
Burdian, March 2005. 
3. EWALL 
EWall is an application which is used to help users to have situation awareness 
through the use of five Modules, which are aimed at “making administering, monitoring, 
collecting, exchanging, and visualizing information more intuitive.  These modules 
support the manual, semi-automatic, and automatic creation of EWall Cards as well as 
the search, exchange, and organization of EWall cards, which are visual representations 
of files, much like desktop icons.”  (EWALL Introduction, 2008)  EWall can help 
decision makers in a MIO environment to handle the abundance of information flowing 
into their station.  The individual EWall cards appear on its workspace as shortcuts 
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organized with the rest of the cards in the order of sequence on a timeline.  Organizing 
the files retrieved from various remote or local nodes in a MIO network is essential to 
expeditious MIOs, which results in a greater advantage against terrorists in the time 
domain. 
4. NPS Video Conferencing (VC) 
Video conferencing is a collaborative tool in which a camera and voice equipment 
is used to enhance the data-sharing relationship between various local and remote nodes.  
By looking and hearing each other through VC, the decision-makers can make decisions 
based on first-hand information without the risk of misinterpretation or time delays.  
When data sharing has to be done without the process of downloading, posting, or 
retrieving, VC allows the participating nodes to collaborate information in a real-time 
manner, thus allowing for a quick turn around for further investigation or actions.  For the 
decision-makers, this tool allows them to quickly receive important updates or send life 
saving orders.  NPS VC allows the users in a portal to communicate via chat, voice, 
video, or data file transfers, thus allowing the users various ways to share data 
expeditiously. 
5. Observer’s Notepad 
This tool allows the participants, especially those located at the TOC or NOC, to 
post observations with time stamps throughout the operation.  These notepads are 
organized by dates and chapters in order to quickly retrieve information in an organized 
manner. 
6. Cellular Phones 
Cellular phones are very popular in today’s society to communicate near real-time 
information.  This is why cell phones have become an excellent back up to other standard 
military communication tools.  The only drawback to cell phones is that it does not 
provide the security needed, when there is sensitive classified information that needs to 
 16
be shared.  Furthermore, use of cell phones is limited to areas where there is a coverage 
area by one of the various cell phone companies’ networks. 
7. Kockums Blue Force Tracker (BFT) 
BFT is a C2/tracking-system constructed of off-the-shelf hardware and presented 
in a GIS. It’s a peer-based design where all thorough units are equal members and no 
node is critical in the network. Nodes are connected Ad-hoc to the network and the 
system will automatically choose the best availably transmission (Automatic routing). 
Every node is equipped with a laptop, GPS, and a communication path to the network.  
(TNT 07-4 AAR) 
 
 
Figure 3. Snapshot using SA Multi-Agent System  
(From TNT 05-2 AAR) 
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C. REQUIRED DATA TO ENHANCE SA AND DM 
1. Nuclear Radiation Data 
Nuclear radiation data can be captured through sensors developed either by the 
LLNL or IST, which have been tested during EMIOs.  This data can be used to evaluate 
an alert from a BP, which has interdicted a suspected HVT and would like to know 
whether or not to detain the vessel and its crew or allow it to continue.  Normally, the BP 
has radiation detection sensors, like the ARAM or IdentiFINDER, which can be triggered 
by anything as small as an old smoke detector or decaying food.  It is necessary to 
quickly provide the detected radiation data to remote experts, which can analyze it and 
disseminate accurate reports back to the TOC, which can make the decision of whether or 
not to continue the search of the source of radiation or to continue with another task on 
board the TV. 
2. Biometric Data 
Biometric data can be captured through BFC’s biometric devices and sent as files 
through the network to the BFC.  These files can then be analyzed and matched with 
suspects on a pre-established database or watch list.  Furthermore, with the collaboration 
of other agencies, like the FBI, International Police, or foreign agencies, these analyzed 
files can further enhance the usefulness of this method of suspect identification.  
Currently, the biometric data that has been used in MIO experiments have focused on 
digital fingerprints.  The BFC is looking into incorporating facial recognition among 
other biometric identification methods. 
3. Video 
Video allows the C2 element to participate in the boarding.  When a TOC 
commander sees something that he/she can relate to some past experience or knowledge, 
that commander’s decision to act on that knowledge or experience can help the boarding 
officer in performing his duties.  For instance, if the commander believes that the 
radiation source is possibly hidden behind a panel on the bulkhead which he/she can see 
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through the streaming video, he/she may take into account a past experience or 
knowledge about a possible explosive trap that might be triggered upon the removal of 
the panel.  Furthermore, the video can also assist in legal matters when a crew decides to 
resist boarding for inspection and takes hostile action towards the boarding crew, which 
then results in commensurate force to apprehend the crew.  The idea behind video 
streaming can benefit any participating node that must see what’s going on in order to 
actively participate without becoming a hindrance in the decision-making process.  
Therefore, it may not be necessary for everyone to have access to the video. 
4. Chat or Instant Messaging 
The communications between the BP and the boarding vessel or TOC is necessary 
in order to provide information about the mission or any updates.  Although, video and 
voice conferencing are great methods of achieving this, those methods can go down 
intermittently from data congestion in the network.  Chat and Instant Messaging (IM) are 
reliable forms of communicating the situation and providing guidance on decisions made 
about the captured or processed data.   Furthermore, Chat or IM can provide a legal 
record or a playback capability to find out what happened at a particular step of the 
boarding. 
5.  Voice 
Although voice communications have been used often to communicate between 
two parties, it has been done using various methods, like handheld radios, cellular 
phones, or VoIP.  In order to corroborate data by speaking to the Boarding Officer or a 
BP member with other remote participants, it must travel via VoIP in order to give 
everyone an opportunity to hear what is happening.  Voice is a near real-time method of 
enhancing SA and decision-making process or actions.  Furthermore, it gives the TOC 
quick access to the Boarding Officer’s cognitive domain by stepping in to guide certain 
steps of the boarding process. 
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6. Files 
The best way to involve remote experts or facilities not involved in a MIO 
network or workspace is to be able to send them a file of pertinent data of what the 
Boarding Officer or TOC wants processed.  It could be a file containing scanned 
paperwork or documents, scanned/digital pictures, files captured from the crew’s 
computer, etc.  The importance of sharing files and updating any information related to 
them is essential in MIO collaboration.  File sharing and updates can be enhanced with 
the use of collaborative tools in which those participants involved can receive the files 
and alerts on any updates to those files.  
D. ENSURING THE DATA’S CONFIDENTIALITY, INTEGRITY, AND 
AVAILABILITY 
These MIO experiments utilized a large number of Virtual Private Network 
(VPN) tunnels to connect sites across the country and around the world, in order to 
provide reliable and secure real-time information sharing.  All VPN tunnels were 
configured across the open Internet, leveraging commercial wired and satellite services to 
physically connect sites.  The VPN infrastructure used to support this experiment 
consisted of both enterprise- and SOHO-level equipment, including CISCO and Netgear 
brand services. 
The configuration used in this experiment placed the Naval Postgraduate School 
at the center of a hub-and-spoke architecture, with all other sites connecting to a central 
VPN concentrator.  In addition to the remote networks connected via LAN-to-LAN 
tunnels.  Many remote participants, including those from Lawrence Livermore National 
Labs, connected via software VPN clients.  The VPN infrastructure was also extended 
across a commercial satellite link into the Riverine operating area inside San Francisco 
Bay, further stretching into the tactical last-mile solution space.  (TNT 07-4 AAR, 10) 
The VPN concept was created to allow distributed users to use the public internet 
without the frustration of dealing with costly security measures that can deflect a budget 
better dedicated to other resources.  VPN’s features help to deflect hacker attacks like 
eavesdropping, masquerading and man-in-the-middle.  (Farrell, 2006)  By encrypting and 
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authenticating both ends of a VPN connection, users can share data without the 
frustration that confidentiality, integrity and, availability of the data has been delayed, 
compromised, or tampered. 
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III. SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THE DATA SHARING 
ENVIRONMENT IN PREVIOUS MIO EXPERIMENTS 
The network of data-sharing from the beginning of MIO Operational Experiments 
has grown from just a few nodes within the Monterrey Peninsula in California and two 
remote nodes, LLNL and NRL TACSAT, to world wide collaboration from countries like 
Sweden, Austria, and Singapore.  As shown in the figure below, the MIO data sharing 
network continues to expand to involve more geographically distributes nodes.  
 
 
Figure 4. MIO Collaboration from Distributed Nodes  





Figure 5. Distributed Node Collaboration to Support DM Nodes During MIO’s 
(From Bordetsky & Friman, 2007) 
 
The following information on previous MIO experiments was summarized from 
After Action Reports (AAR) and NPS Theses from Marvin, Klopson, Burdian, and 
Stavroulakis.  The information about the network technology and sensors used serve to 
understand the environment and network infrastructure upon which the collaborative 
tools rely to provide data sharing to participating nodes.  The figure above shows what 
the collaborative network should be able to do for the decision makers.  Results about the 
data sharing with collaborative tools and the network infrastructure are also included in 
the following summary reports. 
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A. TNT MIO 05-2 
During this experiment, held in Monterey Bay, the following information and 
results were recognized. 
• Network Technology:  
o 802.11b for Mesh Network between Hawksbill and Cypress Sea 
o 802.16 (WiMAX)/OFDM between Cypress Sea and Beach Station, 
between Beach Station and NPS Spanagel Tower, between 
Spanagel and NPS Root Hall (NOC) 
o Ethernet used to connect NPS NOC, TACSAT, and LLNL to 
internet. 
• Radiation Sensors: 
o Rad Pager (gamma & neutron radiation) 
o IdentiFINDER (Radiation Isotope) 
o Neutron Pod (Helium-3 Detector) 
o Ortec Device (NORM, Medical, Industrial, Nuclear, and Natural 
Isotope detector)   
• Collaborative Tools used to provide remote experts the capability to 
participate in the boarding. 
o Groove  
 NOC, the Cutter, the Boarding Team (BT), TACSAT, and 
the LLNL (to allow for information and file sharing and 
whiteboard functionality) 
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o NPS Situational Awareness (SA) Multi Agent System  
 NOC, the Cutter, the Boarding Team, TACSAT, and the 
LLNL (to view the position of all the others, receive real-
time video from each other, as well as conduct real-time 
chat as required.) 
o NPS VC1 
• Results: 
o Communications established with all participants except Hawksbill 
using GROOVE due to intermittent connectivity problems with the 
802.11 link between Hawksbill and Cypress Sea. 
o Video and audio established with all participants except Hawksbill 
using SA Multi Agent System. 
o TACSAT placed radiation Alert on SA screen.  NPS NOC and 
Cypress Sea acknowledged. 
o TACSAT posted ELINT information and imagery files of 
Monterey Bay in Groove’s LLNL Experiment Workspace. 
o Information on LLNL Groove Workspace was copied and placed 
in NOC Groove Workspace for synchronization with Cypress Sea. 
o BT did not have success transmitting downloaded radiation data 
from Rad Pager, IdentiFINDER, Ortec Device, and Neutron Pod 
from BP’s laptop to Cypress Sea via 802.11 mesh network. 
o BP had success transmitting downloaded radiation data from 
Cypress Sea to NOC via 802.16/ OFDM network. 
o LLNL positively identified radioactive substance, once radiation 
files posted in LLNL workspace and alerts (via Groove messaging) 
acknowledge by LLNL and TACSAT. 
o The DNOC (Cypress Sea) shared NOC (NPS) Workspace. 
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o DNOC and Boarding Team (BT) shared same workspace when 
connected. 
o NOC relied on DNOC as relay for the BT’s information. 
o DNOC was able to access LLNL Groove Workspace, if needed. 
• Conclusions: 
o SA Multi Agent System provided each player with a common 
operating picture that actually depicted real-time locations and 
communications between all of the experiment’s participants. 
o GROOVE Virtual Office allowed for improved synchronization of 
the data collected at sea to the NOC and scientists back at the lab 
for analysis. 
o The Groove collaborative application software saves all the text 
messaging that goes on between the participants, therefore, 
participants are able to go back to the Groove workspace and see 
the entire conversation that took place between them.  
Furthermore, all files that are saved in the workspace remain there 
(with a timestamp) until deleted. 
o The 802.11 link is susceptible to disruptions caused by various 
interferences such as cordless phones, Bluetooth devices, and 
microwave ovens, which are all used onboard Coast Guard Cutters 
and target vessels.  Therefore, 802.16 should replace 802.11 in 
conditions similar to this in order to avoid connectivity problems 
which may inhibit, corrupt, or disrupt data-sharing with 
collaborating participants. 
o Groove provides an excellent system for secure file transfer, 
whiteboard, chat and other beneficial collaborative tools. 
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o SA Agent provides real-time video and position information of 
assets and targets to greatly enhance overall situational awareness 
of users. 
o Both Groove and SA Agent can be used simultaneously to create 
an excellent Common Operating Picture (COP) for maritime and 





Figure 6. Network Configuration for TNT MIO 05-2  






Figure 7. Real-time SA Display in NOC, with Live Video from Cypress Sea  
(From TNT 05-2 AAR) 
 
B. TNT MIO 05-3 
This experiment, also held in Monterey Bay, provided the opportunity to test a 
simulated portable AN-50M from the target vessel to the Boarding Vessel (BV) and also 
test LLNL’s UWB technology to transmit radiation data within the ship’s structure.  The 
following information and results were recognized. 
• Network Technology:  
o 802.16/OFDM network between Hawksbill and Cypress Sea 
o 802.16 (WiMAX)/OFDM between Cypress Sea and Beach Station, 
between Beach Station and NPS Spanagel Tower, between 
Spanagel and NPS Root Hall (NOC) 
o Ethernet used to connect NPS NOC, TACSAT, and LLNL to 
internet. 
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o UWB used to send radiation data from inside the ship’s structure to 
an Ethernet switch connecting it to the Boarding Officer’s laptop, 
hence the 802.16 link back to the Cypress Sea. 
• Radiation Sensors: 
o GN-5 (from Innovative Survivability Technologies (IST))   
• Collaborative Tools used to provide remote experts the capability to 
participate in the boarding. 
o Groove  
o Situational Awareness (SA) Multi Agent System  
o NPS VC1 
• Results: 
o LLNL used a radiation material histogram to download into LLNL 
laptop and post to GROOVE workspace. 
o 802.16/OFDM had excellent throughput at extended range of 1,000 
meters combined with low latency and resistance to interference. 
• Conclusions: 
o 802.16 should replace 802.11 to maintain or to enhance data 
sharing in long range conditions, or conditions with signal 
interference, such as strong Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) or 
Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) from shipboard or personal 





Figure 8. SA Assets in Monterey Bay  
(From TNT 05-3 Full AAR) 
 
C. TNT MIO 05-4 
This experiment provided the opportunity to test the AN-50M (portable 
802.16/OFDM) at a longer range of 2,000 yards and the GN-5 radiation detector.  
LLNL’s UWB technology was re-tested by transmitting radiation data from the 
downloaded radiation files from IST’s GN-5 radiation detector.  The following 
information and results were recognized. 
• Network Technology:  
o AN-50M link between Hawksbill and Del Monte Beach Lab 
o 802.16 (WiMAX)/OFDM between Beach Station and NPS 
Spanagel Tower, between Spanagel and NPS Root Hall (NOC) 
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o Ethernet used to connect NPS NOC, TACSAT, and LLNL to 
internet. 
o UWB to send radiation data from inside the ship’s structure to an 
Ethernet switch connecting it to the Boarding Officer’s laptop, 
hence the 802.16 link back to shore. 
• Sensors: 
o GN-5 (from IST) 
o Fingerprint Reader (from BFC)   
• Collaborative Tools used to provide the remote experts the capability to 
participate in the boarding. 
o Groove 
o NPS SA Multi-Agent System 
o NPS VC1 
• Results: 
o LLNL able to download radiation material data from GN-5 to post 
on GROOVE workspace. 
o AN-50M had excellent throughput of 1.0 Mbps at extended range 
of 2,000 yards.  Foliage near the Del Monte Beach Lab was a 
probable contributing factor to a decreased data rate. 
o GROOVE facilitated voice and chat. 
o LLNL and BFC were able to open GROOVE files in less than two 
minutes. 
o Biometrics data collection and processing of 5 “ten print” cards 
took 15 to 20 minutes. 
o Operational coordination was handled by VoIP to various nodes. 
o Group Chat and Text Messaging was also used extensively. 
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o SA Multi Agent worked well to provide limited positional data and 
alerts to large events. 
o Video Conference was a problem via ISGIANT/VC1 server at 
NPS. 
• Conclusions: 
o The use of the 802.16 link through the portable AN-50M continues 
to prove its reliability, even at longer ranges to enhance data 
sharing. 
o GROOVE and SA Agent continue to prove their reliability to 
provide a usable workspace and to enhance SA for remote nodes. 
o VC1 can continue to be a useful tool if the server problems are 
resolved. 
D. TNT MIO 06-1 
This experiment, conducted in Alameda, California, was an opportunity to 
continue rapidly deployment evaluation of networks and advanced sensors in MIOs.  To 
simulate the operational conditions of a realistic MIO, it was essential to focus the efforts 
of this experiment in the BP’s ability to rapidly set-up ship-to-ship communications in 
order to search for radiation and explosive sources while keeping in contact with the BV 
and collaborating with remote sensor experts.  The following facts were recognized. 
• Network Technology:  
o Portable AN-50M (802.16/OFDM) link  
o 802.16 (WiMAX)/OFDM 
o Ethernet used to connect NPS NOC, TACSAT, and LLNL to 
internet. 
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o UWB to send radiation data from inside the ship’s structure to an 
Ethernet switch connecting it to the Boarding Officer’s laptop, 
hence the 802.16 link back to shore. 
• Sensors: 
o GN-5 (from IST) 
• Collaborative Tools used to provide remote experts the capability to 
participate in the boarding. 
o Groove   
o SA Multi-Agent 
o NPS VC1 
• Results: 
o LLNL able to download radiation material data from GN-5 
radiation detector to post on GROOVE workspace. 
o AN-50M had excellent throughput of 1.0 Mbps at extended range 
of 2,000 yards.  Foliage near the Del Monte Beach Lab was a 
probable contributing factor to a decreased data rate. 
o GROOVE facilitated voice and chat. 
o LLNL and BFC were able to open GROOVE files in less than two 
minutes. 
o Biometrics data collection and processing of 5 “ten print” cards 
took 15 to 20 minutes. 
o Operational coordination was handled by VoIP to various nodes. 
o Group Chat and Text Messaging was also used extensively. 
o SA Multi-Agent worked well to provide limited positional data and 
alerts to large events. 
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o The use of 802.16 technologies through the portable AN-50M 
continues to prove its reliability, even at longer ranges to enhance 
data sharing.  An autonomous, advanced ship-to-ship 
communication capability and network during simulated MIO 
within 15 minutes was successfully established. 
o Biometric and radiation detection data were successfully and 
accurately transmitted to the BFC and Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory. 
o The VPN access to OFDM-ITT Mesh network disabled the Groove 
clients in several nodes.  Precise configuration of every laptop 
stack resolved the problem.  
o The Boarding Party was able to provide biometric data and 
Radiation Detection Data via VPN reach back to Biometric Fusion 
Center and LLNL.   
o The response time for biometrics data sharing and response from 
the BFC was reduced to 4 min. 
o Latency of sync with all sites (out band coordination): less than 2 
min 
o Robust Groove data sharing applications network between the 
Boarding Party Members and remote experts permitted the team to 
make decisions to proceed to the next step in the process in a 
period of 2-4 minutes; e.g. from biometrics ID (BFC) step to the 
search for non-proliferation machinery  (DTRA) step, etc. 
• Conclusions: 
o GROOVE continues to prove its reliability to provide a usable 
workspace for remote nodes. 
o Man-Pack OFDM network combined with ITT mesh along the 
deck is feasible. 
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o Ultra-wide-band (UWB) link from the top deck to two floors down 
to the radiation and explosive detection sensors also appeared to be 
feasible. 
o ITT mesh connectivity is vulnerable to obstacles. 
o Streamlining VPN with mesh routing is essential for future 
operations. 
o Video Conference continued to be a problem via ISGIANT/VC1 
server at NPS, but can prove to be a valuable tool. 
E. TNT MIO 06-2 
This MIO experiment was held, once again, in Alameda, California.  It provided 
the opportunity to test the FLASH/OFDM Wireless PC card which falls under the 802.20 
wireless technologies.  The following information and results were recognized. 
• Network Technology:  
o 802.16/OFDM network between SS Gem State and USCGC Tern 
o 802.16 (WiMAX)/OFDM between Cypress Sea and Beach Station, 
between Beach Station and NPS Spanagel Tower, between 
Spanagel and NPS Root Hall (NOC) 
o Flash/OFDM 802.20 
o Ethernet used to connect NPS NOC, TACSAT, and LLNL to 
internet. 
o UWB to send radiation data from inside the ship’s structure to an 
Ethernet switch connecting it to the Boarding Officer’s laptop, 
hence the 802.16 link back to the TOC. 





o Biometrics Station with Fingerprint Reader   
• Collaborative Tools used to provide remote experts the capability to 
participate in the boarding. 
o Groove 
o NPS SA Multi-Agent System 
o NPS VC1 
• Results: 
o VPN provided real-time shared access of operational events (UAV 
video, photos, BFC data) allowing BFC, USSOCOM and USCG 
Alameda to participate. 
o Multiple Human System Integration (HIS) issues within the TOC 
were identified: 
 TOC command area should be restructured to emphasize 
personnel placement according to area of responsibility 
 Routine confusion among TOC personnel noted because of 
inadequate data screen labeling or screen prioritization 
 Frequently redundant data windows displayed 
o During BP’s transit via RHIB to TV (USCG Tern) adequate 
streaming video was received in VC1 through the ITT mesh, as 
long as there was clear LOS, which was achieved up to a 
maximum range of 500 yards. 
o 802.20 had outstanding performance maintaining connection at 
“near” Line of Sight (NLOS) conditions. 
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o 802.16 had connectivity issues unless LOS was obtained through 
manual antenna alignment. Self-aligning antennas will solve this 
problem. 
o Ship’s navigation radar and 802.20 do not affect the 802.16 link 
connectivity. 
o Radiation and biometric data files were sent to remote experts at 
average distance of 1,000 yards via 802.16. 
o 802.16 maintained connectivity at a maximum distance of 2,000-
2,400 yards. 
o NAT router settings at USCG Alameda inhibited NPS NOC from 
receiving or monitoring data remotely. 
o Lack of GPS devices connected to BO’s and BFC’s laptops 
resulted in no data capture of time or position of both laptops. 
• Conclusions: 
o 802.16 and 802.20 links working together to transmit data helped 
to maintain or to enhance data sharing. 
o 802.20 performed well up to a distance of 3 nm from the base 
station and NLOS conditions. 
o UWB wireless LAN performed well, providing radiation material 
pictures and video from internal spaces to be transmitted to the 
TOC. 
o ITT Mesh network performed well, allowing streaming video from 
BO’s laptop to reach the TOC onboard the BV (Gem State) at a 
distance of 500 yards. 
o Groove provided the collaboration workspace to enhance the BO’s 
SA in order to take the right steps based upon the decisions made 
by remote participants/experts.  
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F. TNT MIO 06-3 
During TNT 06-3, more participants were added to the collaboration environment 
to better evaluate the situational awareness and correct decision-making process during a 
more complex scenario.   
 
 
Figure 9. TNT 06-3 MIO Experiment Network Overview  




• Network technology 
o 900 MHz link to connect YBI TOC to SFPD Marine Unit-3 RHIB 
o ITT Mesh to connect YBI TOC to TV.  The internal ITT mesh 
included Solar Winds monitoring laptop and ITT Mesh access 
point with local GPS receiver. 
o ITT Mesh between BO’s network monitoring laptop and ITT AP 
with Garmin GPS receiver and poster 
o 802.16 from TV (Alameda County Sheriff Marine Patrol Boat) to 
YBI TOC, from YBI TOC to Alameda Island, from Alameda to 
LBNL, from LBNL to USCG Island to access public internet 
through VPN tunnel back to the TNT network 
• Sensors 
o IdentiFINDERS from LLNL 
o Biometric Fingerprint Device 
• Collaborative Tools 
o Groove participants 
o NPS SA Multi-Agent System 
o NPS VC1 
o E-Wall data fusion and situational awareness memory mechanism 
• Results 
o Live collaboration and decision-making (voice, video, and data) 
successfully utilized to conduct boarding and search with inputs from 
Sweden and Austria. 
o Three sets of fingerprints were sent from Biometrics enrollment laptop 
to the Biometrics Master computer at the USCG YBI TOC. 
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o Obtained radiation files were transferred from IdentiFINDERS from 
MSST to LLNL laptop and from there to the BP’s Groove laptop via 
flash memory stick to post to Groove Workspace because LLNL 
laptop was not loaded with Groove’s client software. 
o Incorrect time stamps on all Groove client laptops.  CENETIX server 
GPS time sent to all Groove laptops to keep time stamps correct and 
consistent. 
o Incorrect labeling of two posted radiation files on Groove caused 
confusion regarding the first radiation source detected by MSST. 
o Photographs of radiation source #2 downloaded to BO’s laptop and 
posted on Groove further help identify the source. 
o The three following Groove Workspaces used incorrectly probably 
from complexity of environment: 
 District 11, for C2 and DM 
 BP 
 Network for technical and experiment issues 
o Boarding Party replaced omni-directional antenna for the 802.16 link 
from TV to TOC to avoid having connectivity problems from lack of 
LOS. 
o 802.16 link was stretched to only 700 yards, due to directional 
antennas being replaced with omni-directional ones with 6dB gain. 
o Target Vessel’s navigation radar (Furuno, I-band/9 GHz) did not affect 
the performance of the 802.16 or 900 MHz links. 
o AN-80s could not be configured to be used on TV, although successful 
previously at Camp Roberts. 
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o The BO’s network monitoring laptop and GPS receiver/poster laptop 
had negligible contribution to 802.16 total throughputs which was 
estimated at 2 Mbps. 
o The Yerba Buena Island TOC was unsuccessful in establishing 802.16 
connections with LLNL.  Problem is suspected to be with LLNL 
configuration.  Also, Yerba Buena Island TOC was unable to access 
Groove area, via Coast Guard Island.  Possible cause is a bad relay 
server, which is required for the collaborative network, including files 
transfers for Biometric Fusion analysis and radiation spectrum analysis 
by LLNL. 
o Several problems caused inability to establish solid Groove 
participation at TV.  Server at Coast Guard Island was overloaded 
(connection to NPS server is through this server and 802.16 
connections at TOC).  Intermediate 802.16 link connectivity between 
TOC and Berkeley 802.16 relay, thus keeping LLNL out of Groove 
area, was eventually worked out. 
o Successfully proved the 802.16 link connectivity between TV NOC 
and TOC through ability to view TOC roof camera on TV NOC 
laptop. 
o Radiation information was transmitted, via Groove workspace, to 
LLNL Watch Office via 900MHz connection between SFPD boat and 
TOC. 
o SFPD could not directly transfer spectrum file since complete software 
was not loaded onto their laptop. 
o Boarding party successfully boarded TV and conducted search for 3 
hidden radiation sources.  Boarding party found all three sources and 
submitted 3 reports, via Groove workspace to District 11. 
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o During boarding, replaced 5-port switch with 8-port switch to allow 
room for Biometrics Enrollment laptop and additional Groove laptop. 
o Biometrics personnel were also taking and submitting fingerprints to 
Biometrics Master Computer, located in TOC, via the 802.16 link 
between TV and TOC.  Message was sent from BP to TOC via Groove 
that fingerprint files were available. 
o MSST successfully found radiation source after boarding.  Data was 
transferred via oral report to Boarding Officer (played by NPS 
personnel) and entered into Groove Workspace with LLNL Watch 
office.  Boarding Officer also provided USCG District 11 regular 
status reports. 
o MSST successfully found second radiation source and submitted 
information orally to Boarding Officer who entered information into 
Groove Workspace with LLNL Watch Officer.  MSST later 
transferred spectrum data from first source to LLNL laptop which was 
then transferred to memory stick and then provided to Boarding 
Officer.  Confusion arose due to mislabeling of source and noise on 
second set of spectrum data files.  Once the files were correctly 
identified and posted to Groove Workspace, LLNL was able to review 
file and correctly determine that the source was Plutonium. 
o Directly connecting digital camera to Target Vessel NOC laptop 
allowed BT to post picture of second radiation source (smoke detector) 
to Groove Workspace, which was reviewed and confirmed by LLNL 
to be a smoke detector. 
o Conducted several successful radiation detection passes by SFPD boat 
and TV.  Radiation information was transmitted, via Groove 
workspace, to LLNL Watch Office via 900MHz connection between 




o Overall, the 802.16 link had excellent performance and was able to 
accommodate the requirements of exchanged data. 
o There were no problems with the network reliability or performance. 
o Overall, the SA of all participants was sufficient to enhance the DM 
process. 
o The addition of international participants proved that there are no 
limits on who can be included and from where in the world. 
o TOC maintained connection with Berkeley relay, and thus LLNL via 
802.16, and Coast Guard Island.   
o SFPD could not directly transfer spectrum file since complete software 
was not loaded onto their laptop. 
o Need to follow rules of Groove Workspace.  Keep posting of files 
(radiation and biometrics) and message in Boarding Party workspace.  
Decision information should be kept in District 11 workspace.  
Network workspace should only be used for experiment control. 
o Need to configure laptop for Boarding Officer with proper Groove 
workspace. 
o Did get good video from Austrian source of vehicle.  Still need to set 
up Groove Workspace for Austrians to use.  Sweden also able to 
upload video/data via Groove in order to participate. 
o LLNL was able to open radiation file posted from TV NOC 
o Initially, SFPD used Groove to relay information to Radiological 
Assistance Program (RAP) personnel (via 900MHz connection to 
TOC).  RAP will also get LLNL on Groove and USCG District 11. 
o Need to set time on all laptops to Internet time before starting 
experiments.   
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o MIO experiments accomplished what was required, set up network and 
used Groove Workspace to exchange information used for Boarding 
Party to make tactical decisions. 
o Multiple Groove workspaces were confusing for LLNL and BP. 
Difficult to monitor all workspaces and update all required 
workspaces. 
o LLNL needs PELCO software to view video through cameras on 
Target Vessel or TOC vice using photographs.  It should be available 
to all participants. 
 
 
Figure 10. TV Pre-Boarding NOC 
(From TNT 06-3AAR) 
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G. TNT MIO 06-4 
During this MIO experiment, the focus was to make the operational conditions 
more complex by adding more participants and sharing more data through them. 
• Network Technology 
o Same as before.  However, this was the first time Self Aligning 
OFDM (SAOFDM) antennas were used, providing 1.5- 3Mbps 
bandwidth support for collaborative tools and video feeds up to 4.5 
miles off shore. 
• Sensors 
o Same as before. 
• Collaboration Tools 
o Same as before. 
• Results 
o All CONUS and overseas nodes were able to interact in the 
collaborative environment with voice, data, and observe video and 
radiation detection from remote warning sites in Sweden, Austria, 
and Singapore. 
o Limiting visual detection was the hazy weather from fog and 
humidity. 
o Data sharing flowed seamlessly between participants, like the 
posting of video and radiation information by the Austrians to the 
sending and posting of pictures by the BP from the TV. 
o The NPS OFDM network successfully linked the ship and shore 
components in the San Francisco Bay area.  It also linked the NPS 
NOC in Monterey to Camp Roberts, and the Stiletto to the Navy 
site ashore in San Diego.  VPN connections linked the various 
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OFDM network components as well as the technical reach-back 
sites and the coalition participants. 
o The network successfully linked all of the below players (see 
Figure 11) into the collaborative environment, including the 
Stiletto ship in San Diego acting as the Navy Cell and an adaptive 
networking node. 
o Groove was used in the following ways to perform the following 
functions: 
 Discussion Board / Chat – for text communication between 
nodes.  The discussion board is better than chat because it 
enforces hierarchy relationships of the different posts.  This 
makes it much easier to follow information in the 
asynchronous and distributed decision making 
environment. 
 File Transfer – primarily for distributing data files from the 
BT to/from the Reach-back facilities.   
o Task Manager – using this tool in the control (TOC and 
Networking) workspace gave participants an easy and informative 
way to monitor the progress of the scenario.  It was an excellent 
use of a previously unused Groove tool. 
• Conclusion 
o This experiment further evaluated the network and collaborative 
tools in a more realistic worldwide environment.  The experiment 
further proved a successful network topology and collaborative 
tools supports a collaborative environment. 
o A solution to handling a complex MIO operational environment is 
to include more personnel at every level to manage data and 
technical issues. 
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o Everyone involved had near-real time, simultaneous access to the 
events as scripted and everyone was able to witness the events 
unfold at the same time. 
o Overall, the situational awareness of all participants was sufficient 
to enhance the cognitive process and produce correct decisions, 
due to the participation of the right players in the collaboration 
environment and the use of Groove, SA and E-Wall collaboration 
tools.   
o Once the network was established, data sharing was not an issue.  
However, network from mobile to stationary nodes had an impact 
on the quality and reliability of video between them.  This was not 
a problem for fixed to fixed nodes.  This is attributed to the LOS 
weakness of the 802.16 link. 
o Duplicate information reported in multiple workspaces frequently 
interrupted the user’s workflow.  This can be solved by 
compartmentalizing personnel to specific workspaces and data. 
o SA Agent provides the geographic positions of the assets and 
status of the network links for the mobile nodes. 
o EWall was used to monitor information alerts.  However, the 
sparse number of alerts posted in EWall limited the effectiveness 
of the tool during this experiment. 
o VOIP phone was an excellent tool for voice communications.  
Video streams were monitored from various nodes, but this 





Figure 11. Collaborative Network 
(From TNT MIO 06-4 AAR) 
 
 
Figure 12. TNT 06-4 MIO Network in SF Bay Area  




Figure 13. View of Groove Virtual Office used in San Diego  




Figure 14. Streaming Video Teleconference Between Stiletto And CENETIX NOC 
(From TNT 07-2 AAR) 
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H. TNT MIO 07-1 
 
 
Figure 15. TNT 07-1 MIO Network in SF Bay Area 





Figure 16. VPN Cloud Connecting MIO with Global Collaborators 





Figure 17. SAOFDM Ship-to-Shore Link Operational on-the-Move in SF Bay 




Figure 18. Ship-to-Shore Link with BV behind Port Structures in the Channel 
(From TNT 07-1 AAR) 
 
 52
• Network technology 
o Self-Aligning OFDM (SAOFDM) 802.16 nodes for ship-to-ship 
and ship-to-shore wireless on-the-move networking.  
o Sky Pilot System and Radio over IP technology for Marine Corps 
DO Unit 
o Sea Fox Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
• Sensors 
o USCG: IdentiFINDER (set to USCG specs), RadPager 
o SFPD: Sodium Iodide  
o IST: ARAM 
o LLNL: ARAM and IdentiFINDER 
• Collaborative Tools 
o Groove peer-to-peer 
o NPS SA Multi-Agent System 
o NPS VC1 
o E-wall data fusion and situational awareness memory mechanism 
• Results 
o Some of the challenges that were overcome involved the stability 
of the VPN infrastructure. 
o SAOFDM provided ship-to-shore communications with YBI TOC 
and between the boarding vessel and target vessel.  However, it 
was still vulnerable to obstacles, which blocked its LOS path. 
o Sky Pilot broadband mesh network extended the MIO 
collaborative environment to a USMC unit conducting search for 
suspects in the port service area. 
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o The Sea Fox USV was used for the first time to target ship video 
observation ahead of manned operations. 
• Conclusion 
o This MIO experiment continued to implement new technology to 
expand the MIO collaboration environment to geographically 
distributed participants. 
o The LLNL team achieved higher levels of performance in drive-by   
Radiation and Explosive detection combined with geographically 
distributed analysis. The overseas sites achieved more advanced 
level of multiple video feeds and collaboration and data sharing 
with MIO participants. 
o OFDM plus commercial satellite reach-back capability allowed the 
Stiletto ship in San Diego to participate remotely, providing real-
time intelligence information into the scenario and conducting 
concurrent OFDM communication tests over water. 
o Swedish participants successfully connected to the experiment via 
the global VPN cloud (see Figures 16 & 19), and participated in 
video conferences as well as providing intelligence inputs 
throughout the scenario. The reach-back to Sweden was a 
simultaneous two-way exchange of two video streams concurrent 
with drive-by radiation detection data-sharing in Groove as seen in 
Figure 20, below. 
o The participants in Singapore also injected intelligence data during 
the scenario, and were successfully monitoring all video feeds 
during the experiment. 





Figure 19. Swedish Collaborated Remotely Via VC1 and SA Interfaces 





Figure 20. TNT MIO 07-1 Network in San Francisco Bay Area 
(From TNT 07-1 AAR) 
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I. TNT MIO 07-2 
 
 
Figure 21. TNT MIO 07-2 Network in SF Bay Area 
(From TNT 07-2 AAR) 
  
 
This experiment introduced the ITT mesh-based drive-by radiation detection 
network, augmented by the Sky Pilot system, capable of providing higher transmission 
rates.  Figure 22 below illustrates the Sky Pilot setup on the SFPD Marine Unit Boat. The 
Sky Pilot network expanded the MIO collaborative environment to the Marine unit in the 
port service area to allow them to participate.  This experiment further proved the 





Figure 22. Sky Pilot Networking Node Setup on the SFPD MU Boat 
(From TNT 07-2 AAR) 
 
• Network Technology 
o MIMO OFDM 802.16 link was explored as ship-to-shore 
extension to GG Bridge node for open waters environment. The 
application goal was to enable video feed from the TV approaching  
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the GG Bridge and SF Bay. The video feed failed, but the link 
demonstrated strong performance at 100 Mbps level from as far as 
10 nm to GG Bridge 
o Fixed OFDM 802.16 backbone stretched out to the GGB site for 
ship-to-shore link in open waters.  
o SAOFDM/802.16 for BV to TOC and BV to TV links 
o ITT Mesh for Sea Fox USV and Oakland Police Marine Unit 
network for drive-by radiation detection 
o Iridium Link for radiation sensor file transmission 
o Quadro Iridium Solution for Underground Vehicle (UGV) video 
o Integration of LRV, Sky Pilot, and Geo-Satellite Link for UGV 
high quality video 
• Sensors 
o ARAM 
o Swedish CBRN Vest 
• Collaboration Tools 
o Groove 
o NPS SA Multi-Agent System 
o NPS VC1 
o Swedish CBRN Vest 
• Results 
o The new self-aligning broad band wireless solutions supported 
boarding and target vessels on-the-move with critical 2-3 nm 
distances between the vessels. 
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o MIO Fixed OFDM 802.16 backbone stretched out to Golden Gate 
Bridge site was stable with strong signal to LBNL relay. 
o Biometrics identification with forward deployed data base latency 
less than 1 min 
o Depiction of biometrics identification in SA view, geolocationally 
synchronized 
o Rapid introduction of chat spaces  ( two hour adaptation cycle) for 
substituting failed Groove shared environment 
o Remote video demonstration of Sensor Vest from Sweden (drive-
by detection simulation) 
o End-to-end networking with Radiation Detection sensors during 
drive-by and Boarding Party search phases resulted in six out of 
six sources correct finding and  identification, which is the best 
MIO 2006-2007 result so far 
o The forward deployed biometrics data base allowed CG Boarding 
Officers to fit the biometrics identification  technique in their 
boarding procedures 
o The TOC was able to receive the Sea Fox video of the target vessel 
from different positions, circling around the target vessel. 
• Conclusion 
o The USV operators learned vital lessons of how to control the Sea 
Fox from the Alameda County Sheriff’s fast RHIB. 
o The Sky Pilot broadband mesh network allowed extension of the 
MIO collaborative environment to the USMC unit conducting 
search of individuals planting a radiation source in the port service 
area and proved to be feasible for ship-to-shore communications. 
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o The LLNL team achieved higher levels of performance in drive-by   
radiation and explosive detection combined with geographically 
distributed analysis. 
o The overseas sites achieved a more advanced level of multiple 
video feeds and collaboration and data sharing with MIO 
participants. 
J. TNT MIO 07-3 
 
 
Figure 23. 5/6 June San Francisco Bay Network Diagram 





Figure 24. 7 June San Francisco Bay Network Diagram  





Figure 25. VPN Cloud Connecting MIO with Global Collaborators 
(From TNT 07-3 AAR) 
 
This experiment was a repetition of the last.  It was, however, a new perspective 
on the VPN’s affect on the network.  The VPN Concentrator at NPS was used as a hub in 
a hub-and-spoke architecture for purpose of simplicity and to remain a constant hub even 
though the nodes (or spokes) in this architecture may change over time.  One of the issues 
was that the VPN concentrator at LBNL had its internet connection dropped due to the 
LBNL network’s Intrusion Detection System falsely identifying the MIO’s experiment 
traffic as an attack.  The other issue was access list management for all VPN connections.  
The hub-and-spoke architecture makes the access list configuration for shared IP address 
time-consuming and prone to errors.  This was more noticeable for the Sky Pilot and Sea 
Fox arbitrary networks, for which the VPN architecture was not configured to handle.  
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The recommendations made were to have a pre-established network map for all 
participating networks, in order to expedite access list configuration.  The other 
recommendation was to adjust the VPN architecture to accept dynamic allocation of 





Figure 26. YBI NOC Showing Austria and Germany Video Feed 





Figure 27. YBI NOC Showing Video Feed from Boarding Vessel on 6 June 
(From TNT 07-3 AAR) 
 
• Network Technology 
o SAOFDM/802.16 between BV and TV and between BV and 
GGB 
o Fixed OFDM/802.16 between GGB and LBNL, between 
LBNL and CGI Alameda, and between LBNL and Alameda PT 
o MIMO between GGB and TV 





• Collaborative Tools 
o Groove 
o NPS SA Multi-Agent System 
o Jabber 
o NPS VC1 
o EWall 
• Results 
o Radiation file posting to Groove Workspace caused confusion 
due to same file used for both days of experiment. 
o Cell phone was used by the BP to inform YBI NOC of updates, 
which YBI NOC then posted to Jabber’s discussion area. 
o NPS VC1 was used by Austria and LLWO to post or view 
radiation files and live video. 
o Clear and stable video from the BV to the YBI NOC via 
successful SAOFDM link between BV and the GGB. 
o ITT Mesh established between BV and TV. 
o 802.16/OFDM links with mobile nodes, like the BV and TV, 
was problematic, but successful with all other fixed nodes. 
o Groove Workspace confusion was mitigated by using one 
workspace per day.  A separate chat window was used to 
handle network administration trouble calls with Austria. 
o Headquarters (HQ) was able to quickly provide guidance to 
BP, once information was posted to Groove Workspace by 
Austria and LBNL. 
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o Clear, steady, and reliable video received from Austria and 
GGB.  See figure 26. 
o Quick response time for posting and acknowledgment of 
discussion threads. 
o Radiation file retrieval and analysis between Austria and 
LBNL was processed within one and a half hours.  Discussions 
were used to inform necessary nodes of file posting. 
o Jabber was used for discussion and SA Agent used for file 
posting among participants on the second day of experiments 
due to lack of Groove synchronization. 
o Using Google Earth and VPN connection with 
Austria/Germany border station, suspect movement was 
accurately tracked. 
o Files and discussion from the BP was synchronized with the 
Groove Workspace maintained by YBI TOC 
o All information received via cell phone from BP was posted to 
Groove Workspace for all other participants to observe. 
o BP could not post files to Groove Workspace, therefore they 
could only communicate information via cell phone.  This was 
a result of no LOS path between GGB SAOFDM and BV 
SAOFDM due to disrupted 900 MHz control signal for GGB 
SAOFDM near metropolitan area. 
o LBNL able to retrieve Austria’s radiation files 




o Severe noise effects encountered by the MIMO segment 
highlight the fact that it should be a well aligned directional 
solution.  This is exactly what SAOFDM does in the most 
accurate adaptive way.   
o The border control simulation site in Bavarian Alps produced 
full scale video and radiation detection feed during the building 
search and check point control.  For the first time the radiation 
detection script was generated by local source unknown to 
LLNL experts and was successfully decodes within several 
minutes. 
o The HQ C2 Cell was formed as a part of the MIO test-bed 
environment.  It produced detailed analysis for the MOTR plan 
based C2 activities integration and provided foundation for 
interagency coordination scenario elements. 
• Conclusion 
o New solutions for bridging different collaborative technology 
platforms (Groove, Jabber, EWall, and NPS VC Tool) for 
going across hierarchical boundaries were revealed during the 
extensive data sharing process with the checkpoint site in 
Bavarian Alps. 
o The drive-by detection in the open waters revealed best 
benefits of the ITT mesh solution for RHIB-Boarding vessel 
communications. It worked perfectly during the first day, 
marked by the very rough waters, and delivered good data 
sharing quality. 
o Groove synchronization must be done prior to experiment.  
Otherwise, Jabber and NPS CENETIX Video Conference 
Room serve as excellent redundant data-sharing media to keep 
every node informed. 
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o MIMO needs to have well aligned directional antennas in order 
to provide better link connectivity. 
o 900 MHz is a problematic frequency to control SAOFDM 
antennas in areas dominated by an abundance of 900 MHz 
range signals from cellular phones. 
K. TNT MIO 07-4 
During TNT MIO 07-4, the objective was the same as before.  However, the 
particular focus of TNT MIO 07-4 was on networking and data sharing solutions.  This 
was enabled by using multiple small craft interdiction teams to rapidly respond to nuclear 
radiation threats in the San Francisco bay area.  (TNT 07-4 AAR)  In addition to the bay 
area, two other areas were included, outside the GGB and the Vallejo Riverine area.  This 
expansion of the MIO operational environment was necessary to further evaluate the 
implementation of network equipment and collaboration tools to reach the objectives.      
The “challenge was to allow all parties, while the searches were in progress, to 
share live video feeds, emanating radiation data, and biometric information with experts 
to form possible connections with known threats.”   Furthermore, “providing continuing 
two-way video sharing between the Riverine site and the YBI TOC appeared to be 




Figure 28. TNT MIO 07-4 Network Topology 




Figure 29. Diagram of VPN Topology Used in TNT MIO 07-4 
(From TNT MIO 07-4 AAR) 
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• Network Technology 
o SAOFDM/802.16, OPAREA ONE: between BV and TV and 
between BV and GGB, OPAREA TWO: between BV and TV and 
between BV and YBI TOC 
o Fixed OFDM/802.16 between GGB and LBNL, between LBNL 
and District 11 USCG HQ, and between LBNL and Alameda Pt, 
between Alameda Pt and YBI TOC, between LBNL and Mt. 
Diablo, and between Mt. Diablo and LLNL 
o ITT Mesh, OPAREA TWO: between BP RHIB and BV, and 
between Sea Fox (USV) and BV 
o Sky Pilot, OPAREA THREE: between Tachyon Satellite and Sky 
Pilot Relay and between Sky Pilot Relay and BV 
o Wave Relay, OPAREA THREE: between BV and Balloon and 
between Balloon and TV 
• Sensors 
o ARAM on Sea Fox and USCG Tern’s RHIB 
o Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Vest 
• Collaborative Tools 
o Groove 
o Jabber 
o NPS SA Multi-Agent System 
o NPS VC1 




o Based on the intelligence received earlier and the alerts posted by 
the monitoring center the first small craft was intercepted in the 
open waters west of Golden Gate Bridge, simulating the site in NY 
Harbor.  Simultaneously the second small craft was intercepted in 
the S.F. Bay and searched for nuclear devices.  Also 
simultaneously, the third target vessel was found and interdicted in 
the S.F. Bay riverine area. 
o ARAM systems aboard the Sea Fox and the USCGC Tern’s RHB 
did drive-bys looking at the Bowling Ball plutonium surrogate, a 
smoke detector that uses Ra-226, and some Depleted Uranium 
(DU) counter weights.  Four (4) of the six (6) red alarms for Pu 
also included proper identification (the other two Identified as 
Uranium and Americium). 
o This was the first experiment in which real-time emergency 
response coordination was executed between the HQ C2 
(simulation for District 11) and PANYNJ responders based on 
MOTR recommendations. This was accomplished by means of 
networking between the SF Bay boarding parties (simulation for 
the event in NY Harbor) and collaboration between HQ C2 and 






Figure 30. Video feed of SF Bay Interdiction Events into the PANYNJ JSA Tool 
(From TNT MIO 07-4 AAR) 
 
o Multiplatform control link enabling directional broadband OFDM 
network forming on-the-move was used by alternating 900 MHz, 
SMS-GPRS (cellular), and Iridium satellite links.  
o The VPN infrastructure was also extended across a commercial 
satellite link into the riverine operating area inside San Francisco 
Bay, further stretching into the tactical last-mile solution space. 
o The CBRN’s ad-hoc network was able to deploy in a new 
environment; remote participants were able to communicate with 
CBRN vest; and data collected from the CBRN vest.  See Figure 
33 below to see how CBRN fit into the MIO network. 
o The air balloon was able to relay between the Riverine network 
and the police boat on-the-move. 
o Biometrics data sharing and alert propagation achieved with 
Sweden and HLS response system in PANYNJ Center. 
o Clear video from NPS TOC was available. 
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o Biometric files posted successfully.  
o Swedish Naval Warfare Center (SNWC) TOC able to send video. 
o SA of BFT was available through the Internet. 
o Swedish CBRN vest with BFT had successful communications via 
Turbo 3G.  Swedish were able to successfully post biometric files 
into workspace and showed BFT on an interactive webpage.  




Figure 31. SAOFDM Nodes in SF Bay while Conducting Simultaneous Searches 





Figure 32. Linking the Riverine BV to MIO Network via SkyPilot 




o Integrating broadband MIO network on-the-move for small craft 
Radiation/nuclear network-controlled detection and ship-to-ship 
broadband networking in the open waters worked well. 
o Proving feasibility of simultaneous interdiction and data sharing 
between boarding events conducted in the open waters, inside the 
bay, and riverine area. 
o Integrating unmanned assets (Sea Fox), which actively participated 
in conducting drive-by detection with nuclear/radiation sensor 
onboard (Sea Fox) and relaying the riverine network to the police 
boat on-the-move via the aerostat 
o Achieving biometrics data sharing and alert propagation with the 
overseas site in Sweden and HLS response system in PANYNJ 
Center 
o The HQ C2, riverine network segments in the VUSD area, and the 
HLS PANYNJ site became new "nodes" of the MIO test bed. 
Additionally, the projectile-based sensor survived the landing and 
was able to communicate afterwards. 
o Some of the solutions for simultaneous video feeds sharing 
between boarding parties didn't work as expected, providing us 
with good lessons learned for the subsequent application 
networking improvement.  
o All links worked successfully with no observed downtime or 
significant configuration issues. 




Figure 33. Network in Sweden and its Connection to MIO 






Figure 34. CBRN Vest and SNWC TOC 





Figure 35. Example of The BFT Application 




Figure 36. Tactical Operations Center View of CBRN Vest Data 
(From TNT 07-4 AAR) 
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L. TNT MIO 08-1 
• Network Technology 
o SAOFDM/802.16, OPAREA ONE: between BV and TV and 
between BV and GGB, OPAREA TWO: between BV and TV and 
between BV and YBI TOC 
o Fixed OFDM/802.16 between GGB and LBNL, between LBNL 
and District 11 USCG HQ, and between LBNL and Alameda Pt, 
between Alameda Pt and YBI TOC, between LBNL and Mt. 
Diablo, and between Mt. Diablo and LLNL 
o ITT Mesh, OPAREA TWO: between BP RHIB and BV, and 
between Sea Fox (USV) and BV 
o Sky Pilot, OPAREA THREE: between Tachyon Satellite and Sky 
Pilot Relay and between Sky Pilot Relay and BV 
o Wave Relay, OPAREA THREE: between BV and Balloon and 
between Balloon and TV 
• Sensors 
o ARAM on Sea Fox and USCG Tern’s RHIB 
o Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Vest 
• Collaborative Tools 
o Groove 
o Jabber 
o NPS VC1 
o NPS SA Multi-Agent System 




o Directional antenna with wider angle beam (20 degree) is 
preferable since it easily establishes and maintains OFDM LOS 
link up to 5 Km and keeps it more reliable for mobile node 
scenarios.   
• Conclusion 
o Redline radio and IMU connectors should be protected from 
possible water and dust damage. 





Figure 37. San Francisco Bay Topology 
(From TNT 08-2 Planning Document) 
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M. SUMMARY ANALYSIS 
• Recurring problems 
o Intermittent or loss of signal due to LOS problems from lack of 
self-aligning antennas, distance, natural obstacles, structures, or 
disrupted control signal (900 MHz). 
o Signal interference due to RFI or EMI 
o Improper data management, i.e. incorrect file naming or placement 
o Lack of proper hardware or software set up, i.e. NAT, VPN, and 
Groove not properly configured or installed on all remote node 
computers. 
• Recurring Solutions 
o Self-aligning antennas 
o Wireless technology explored or added for redundancy or better 
performance, i.e. 802.16 over 802.11, 802.20, ITT Mesh, UWB, 
900 MHz 
o Collaboration tools added for redundancy or explored for 
advantages, i.e. Groove, SA Multi-Agent System, VC1, CBRN, 
EWall, BFT, Jabber, Cell Phones 
o Adding more nodes to contribute or to analyze intelligence. 
By looking at the results and conclusions of the past MIO experiments, the trend 
of exploring new wireless technology to circumvent obstacles and the search for better 
collaborative tools to improve the data sharing process becomes apparent.  From the MIO 
05-2 experiment, the problems with establishing a link for data sharing became a priority.  
Whether it was a weak wireless link, like 802.11, being replaced with a more robust 
wireless link, like 802.16, or the manual alignment of OFDM antennas being replaced 
with self aligning ones for the mobile maritime nodes, the MIO experiments proved to 
explore better ways to establish links with maritime nodes from shore without hampering 
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the maritime node’s mobility or distance necessary to search for nuclear or explosive 
materials.  Furthermore, sharing near real time captured data from radiation sensors or 
biometric devices through the use of collaborative tools has also improved.  Collaborative 
tools which handle video conferencing, file posting, or discussions can play a major part 
in keeping every node informed of the situation developing.  Finally, the amount of data 
that must be analyzed must be carefully managed in order to avoid confusion or loss of 
valuable information.  With every addition of a collaborative participant or target vessel, 
the human and technological assets must meet the demands to keep the operation moving 
efficiently.  Thus, every MIO has explored that as more participants enter the MIO 
collaborative network to support, enhance, and expedite the DM process, the faster, more 
interoperable, easily accessible, and more reliable the link and collaborative tools have to 
be in order to meet the near real time data sharing requirements of the C2 element, MIO 
forces, and remote experts.  Looking at Tables 1 and 2 below, one can see that the trend 
illustrates an increase in network technology, as more nodes from geographically 
distributed participate in more complex MIO scenarios.  Furthermore, one can also see 
from Table 1 that the most interoperable collaborative tools and sensors must be explored 
in order to capture the data and share it with the other nodes in the network.  It takes a 
single crack in the foundation of those assets to give the opportunity to terrorists or 
criminals to seep through and achieve their objectives. 
The observations of past MIO experiments have shown that adding a riverine 
node should not be a challenge so much as a new area to explore the implementation of 
the technology and collaborative tools used.  As the MIO experiments continue to expand 
to geographically distributed nodes, the riverine area should not be left out of the 
network, since it should contribute a last line of defense in the maritime environment.  
The assets for the riverine area should not be any less viable than in other areas.  
Furthermore, the riverine area should only be an application of what is known to work, to 
evaluate it for contribution to the network, and to find what adjustments need to be made 
to make this node more valuable in the data sharing process. 
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IV. RIVERINE PORTION OF TNT MIO 08-2 EXPERIMENT 
 
 
Figure 38. World-Wide Network Topology 
(From TNT 08-2 Planning Document) 
 
A. OBJECTIVE 
The main objective of the riverine portion of this experiment was to continue to 
utilize successfully tested rapidly-deployable wireless network equipment, radiation 
sensors, and collaborative tools, such as 900 MHz, ARAM, and NPS VC equipment, 
while collaborating with remote LLNL experts.  Furthermore, the rapidly-deployable 
wireless network must be able to share that radiation data and video in near real time 
from the BV/CB with remote experts and decision makers, like LLNL and TOC 
personnel, in order to receive further guidance on the operation.  This experiment would 
evaluate if the data sharing process in a more complex maritime environment would be 
successful with the abundance of data shared among the three operational areas and 
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remote experts and C2 node.  Figures 39 and 40 illustrate the complexity of the network 
and geographic distribution of the nodes participating in the MIO scenario. 
 
 
Figure 39. San Francisco Bay Topology for TNT MIO 08-2 
(From TNT 08-2 Planning Document) 
 
The following information describes the network infrastructure and collaboration 
tools used to keep every node in the loop.  Figures 40 through 43 illustrate the 
environment and the set up to share data among the riverine unit and remote nodes. 
• Network Technology 
o SAOFDM/802.16, OPAREA ONE: between BV and TV and 
between BV and GGB, OPAREA TWO: between BV and TV and 
between BV and YBI TOC 
o Fixed OFDM/802.16 between GGB and LBNL, between LBNL 
and District 11 USCG HQ, and between LBNL and Alameda Pt, 
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between Alameda Pt and YBI TOC, between LBNL and Mt. 
Diablo, and between Mt. Diablo and LLNL 
o ITT Mesh, OPAREA TWO: between BP RHIB and BV, and 
between Sea Fox (USV) and BV 
o Sky Pilot, OPAREA THREE: between Tachyon Satellite and Sky 
Pilot Relay and between Sky Pilot Relay and BV 
o Wave Relay, OPAREA THREE: between BV and Balloon and 
between Balloon and TV 
• Sensors 
o ARAM on Sea Fox and CB 
• Collaborative Tools 
o Groove 
o SA Multi-Agent System 
o NPS VC 
 
 
Figure 40. Google Earth View of SF Bay and Riverine Operation Areas 





Figure 41. YBI TOC Setup 




Figure 42. Alameda County Network and Video Conference Setup 
(From Mercado, 2008) 
 
During the MIO Experiment, the equipment in the following figure was used to 
provide the 900 MHz link and the video conference capability to the BP in order to 
improve the SA and collaboration with remote experts.  With the exception of the 900 
MHz radio, which was built at NPS, the rest of the equipment can be purchased off the 
shelf.  The problem, however, with commercial off the shelf (COTS) equipment is that it 
may not stand up to the rugged environment to which it is exposed either in a Riverine 
area or a dessert.  Furthermore, the equipment’s viability may be challenged by the 
weather elements, such as sea spray, snow, sand, or rain.   
Eventually, the purpose of this experiment is to provide enough supporting data to 
convince the military and civilian law enforcement agencies to accept this technology for 
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field service and put into production a more rugged version, which will survive both the 
weather elements and rugged environments.  Once this equipment is readily available to 
the law enforcement agencies, we can begin to see the expeditious enforcement of 
Riverine MIO operations.  Furthermore, this technology and its implementation may find 




Figure 43. Riverine Network and Video Conference Equipment Setup  




Figure 44. MIO Domestic and International Reach-back Network Topology  
(From TNT 07-4 AAR) 
B. PARTICULAR FOCUS 
The particular focus of the Vallejo Riverine node was to provide a link for the 
radiation data collected by the radiation sensor via the LLNL laptop back to the TOC and 
LLNL in near real time in addition to near real time video streaming.  This link would 
provide the necessary data to enhance the SA for both the TOC and remote radiation 
experts at LLNL to give almost immediate feedback to the CB personnel of potentially 
dangerous radiation elements discovered in the Riverine target vessel.  In addition, 
sharing the radiation data to remote experts through this link would help to keep the BP 
members focused on other aspects of the operations, like searching for any other illegal 
contraband, which may not emit any radiation, or collecting and reviewing the documents 
pertaining to the targets vessel and its crew.  Figures 45 and 46 illustrate the radiation 




Figure 45. Riverine CB with View of BP Network Set-up inside Canopy Area 
(After Netzer, 2008) 
Due to the choppy waters and high winds experienced during the riverine portion 
of the experiment, the network set up had to be done inside the canopy to avoid exposing 
the laptop and peripheral equipment to water.  The Yagi antenna was manually held by 
BP personnel outside the canopy to keep it pointed in the LOS of the balloon relay during 





Figure 46. Riverine CB with View of Radiation Sensor on Port Side of Canopy 
(After Netzer, 2008) 
C. MAJOR RESULTS AND CHALLENGES 
The major results of this portion of the MIO experiment was that it was able to 
confirm a 900 MHz link between the Riverine unit back to the ground station through a 
900 MHz balloon relay, which allowed the TOC to capture and share the CB position 
information via the GPS position poster and NPS SA Agent and video streaming in 
addition to allowing the CB to capture video from a remote Pelco camera on the San 
Francisco bay TV through the 802.16/SAOFDM link.  Furthermore, during the transit, 
the CB was able to view and participate with remote nodes using chat available through 
NPS VC.  Figure 47 below illustrates a snapshot of the video streaming from the CB 
along the river.  The maximum range of 900 MHz connectivity from the CB to the 
balloon relay was approximately 3.5 miles.  Figure 48 below illustrates the CB’s path 
from the pier at USCG Station in Rio Vista down the river before returning, after 
capturing radiation data from the TV during a drive-by.  The breaks in the path are loss of 
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GPS posting connectivity due to loss of 900 MHz link or disconnection of the GPS 
sensor from laptop during transit through choppy waters.  Figure 49 illustrates the 
snapshot of the video streaming from the S.F. bay TV, which was available through the 




Figure 47. Snapshot of SA Agent View of Riverine CB Video Feed 





Figure 48. Google Earth View of Longest Distance Achieved in Riverine Area  
(After Bourakov, 2008) 
One of the breaks 
in connectivity 
during the transit.  
GPS poster marks 






























Figure 49. Snapshot from Riverine BP Laptop of Remote Target Vessel  
(From Bourakov, 2008) 
 
Unfortunately, the biggest challenges were to keep the CB’s laptop connected to 
the MIO network, by keeping the peripherals continuously connected and the Yagi 
antenna within LOS of the balloon relay.  The other challenge was to conduct near real 
time sharing of the radiation files collected by LLNL personnel onboard the CB with the 
remote experts at LLNL for further analysis.  However, due to the lack of a flash drive to 
download the files from the LLNL’s laptop to the BP’s laptop and lack of direct 
connectivity from the LLNL laptop on the CB to the 900 MHz link, the radiation data 
files could not be shared with remote experts until the CB returned to the pier.  This in 
turn, kept the decision makers from being able to quickly act on the detection of radiation 
material onboard the TV.  Furthermore, even if the flash drive was available, the high 
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winds were blowing the balloon relay further down to the surface, inhibiting a LOS path 
from the CB to the relay at the point of TV interdiction. 
The only reliable form of real time communications left was the use of a cell 
phone.  This method, however, was used only to update the TOC that the 900 MHz link 
was intermittent and that radiation files were captured to the LLNL laptop on board the 
CB.  Since the LLNL laptop on the CB was only capable of storing and viewing data 
from the radiation sensor, there were no means available onboard to analyze the captured 
radiation data in order to take action, if necessary, or to inform LLNL or the TOC of what 
was suspected to be onboard the TV.  In this respect, the data sharing tools failed to meet 
their full potential, due to a lack of communications link between the LLNL laptop and 
the remote experts at LLNL or the TOC. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the Vallejo Riverine Area MIO experiment were partially 
successful in that the 900 MHz link can still function in riverine areas as long as it is 
within LOS of the elevated relay as demonstrated by video capture of the S.F. bay TV.  
Additionally, at various times during the experiment, chat was available to the CB.  
Finally, the video streaming from the CB back to the video server at NPS and then back 
to the Riverine unit’s laptop monitor also proved a successful network connection for the 
CB.  Unfortunately, the USB connections for the GPS receiver and camera kept 
disconnecting when the Riverine unit hit choppy waters at a high speed.  This problem 
can be resolved in the future by making the 900 MHz equipment into a self-contained 
unit. 
Even though a test run of the setup was conducted at the ground station before the 
actual experiment began, and everything was checked to ensure that video and voice 
streaming were successful from the BO’s laptop, there was no way to foresee the 
challenges posed once on the CB in riverine waters, especially the lack of a link of real 
time radiation data sharing between the LLNL laptop to LLNL.  Also, the tethered 
balloon was getting blown down to a lower altitude due to high winds.  This in turn cut 
our range down to approximately three and a half miles from the balloon relay.  In less 
than windy conditions, it could have been possible to extend the range from the CB to the 
balloon relay.  This strong winds and sea state are factors of operational conditions which 
cannot be ignored.  Therefore, contingency plans to provide continuous connectivity to 
the network must include an alternate wireless path to the internet, like GSM. 
The experiment turned out to prove that other collaborative tools are out there that 
can be used to augment Groove.  Furthermore, the use of collaborative technology can 
prove to be very beneficial to military and civilian maritime interdiction forces.  The 
tools were quite easy to set up and use.  One of the problems was that the vast amounts of 
data were not properly labeled, used, or captured.  The other problem observed was that 
too much information can pose a problem as much as no information when making a 
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decision.  Furthermore, there is no need for everyone to see or have every bit of data 
available, as this only serves to congest their SA picture.  Therefore, a better preparation 
of the information that needs to be received and analyzed needs to be a focus of the future 
efforts of data sharing during MIO experiments. 
The reason this experiment was conducted the way it was is that the prior 
experiments had proven that it could be done again with the addition of more 
participating geographically distributed nodes.  Furthermore, the new changes that were 
implemented were also tested either in the lab or at Camp Roberts prior to the MIO 
experiment.  There are several factors which were not strongly considered prior to the 
experiment, which include which data was going to be seen by whom and how.  
However, this further shows how these collaborative tools can work in a Maritime 
environment even during rapid deployment.  Therefore, the focus for the next MIO 
experiment is to have a more adaptive concept of operations to reflect the collaborative 
tools true potential to reinforce the features of each other and to enhance SA to expedite 
the decision-making process. 
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VI.  FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. DATA SHARING 
Data sharing between participating parties was also very hazy.  The creation of a 
data manager position at each large participating node would help to clear up any further 
confusion prior, during, and after each experiment.  This position could be developed in 
segments, in which there are two parts, one for the experiment and training and the other 
for real-world scenarios, which are implemented for single or multiple scenarios at a 
time.  
For the Riverine portion of the MIO experiment, a lengthy pre-experiment 
discussion or brief among the members can be recommended.  Of course, even though 
having an adaptive or flexible mindset is more realistic in most scenarios, it is necessary 
to be prepared for anything by having prior knowledge of what ship resources are 
available or not. 
B. REDUNDANCY 
For a redundant path, check GSM coverage along the river to provide multi-path 
option for data exchange.  During the experiment, the BP was able to communicate with 
the TOC and remote TV via cellular phone because GSM coverage was good along the 
river.  For future work, this could provide the alternate path when the 900 MHz link is 
not viable.  This GSM option may not be available everywhere.  Therefore, it is necessary 
to check if coverage is good, and only use it as a redundant path of data exchange.  This 
implementation would require the use of a GPRS modem connected to the BP’s laptop. 
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C. SEPARATION OF TASKS 
A strong recommendation would be to separate NOC/TOC data management 
responsibilities by area of expertise.  This would require a person handling nuclear 
radiation data to manage the distribution, invitations, storing, and displaying of that 
information to participants who need-to-know that information without cluttering their 
situational picture or congesting their data flow with superfluous data.  A NOC 
commander or POC/OIC would be able to coordinate the various areas of responsibilities 
to ensure that data is always posted, retrieved, or gathered when needed without delaying 
the process by serving as the data manager.  This idea would be very similar to a Navy 
ship’s Combat Information Center layout, in which separate areas of warfare, i.e. air, 
surface, subsurface, strike, handle the management of their information and make it 
available upon request to the Tactical Action Officer, who is responsible for maintaining 
the operational situational awareness and acting upon it. 
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